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Background: Existing ethical guidelines recommend that, all else equal, past receipt of a medical resource (e.g. a
scarce organ) should not be considered in current allocation decisions (e.g. a repeat transplantation).
Discussion: One stated reason for this ethical consensus is that formal theories of ethics and justice do not
persuasively accept or reject repeated access to the same medical resources. Another is that restricting attention to
past receipt of a particular medical resource seems arbitrary: why couldn’t one just as well, it is argued, consider
receipt of other goods such as income or education? In consequence, simple allocation by lottery or
first-come-first-served without consideration of any past receipt is thought to best afford equal opportunity,
conditional on equal medical need.
There are three issues with this view that need to be addressed. First, public views and patient preferences are less
ambiguous than formal theories of ethics. Empirical work shows strong preferences for fairness in health care that
have not been taken into account: repeated access to resources has been perceived as unfair. Second, while
difficult to consider receipt of many other prior resources including non-medical resources, this should not be used
a motive for ignoring the receipt of any and all goods including the focal resource in question. Third, when all
claimants to a scarce resource are equally deserving, then use of random allocation seems warranted. However, the
converse is not true: mere use of a randomizer does not by itself make the merits of all claimants equal.
Summary: My conclusion is that not ignoring prior receipt of the same medical resource, and prioritizing those
who have not previously had access to the medical resource in question, may be perceived as fairer and more
equitable by society.Background
The efficient and fair distribution of scarce medical
resources is one of the most difficult problems in society
[1]. This intuitive trade-off between efficiency (e.g. med-
ical need, ability to benefit) and fairness (e.g. waiting
lists, equal chances) [2], may be further characterized as
a trade-off between multiple core ethical values. Existing
ethical guidelines on how to approach such allocation
decisions are informed by many underlying moral prin-
ciples [3]. These include treating all equally, favoring
some on some basis, maximizing total benefits, andCorrespondence: huesch@usc.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orpromoting and rewarding social usefulness (respectively,
egalitarianism, prioritarianism, utilitarianism, and instru-
mentalism or reciprocity) [4].
For concreteness, consider the following example in
the setting of allocating intensive care resources such as
ICU beds. In the United States, the question of how to
allocate limited resource is addressed in a critical care
position statement authored by the specialty American
Thoracic Society. The Society’s statement affirms the
principle of egalitarianism in that: “Health care providers
and institutions should ensure that ICU patients receive
all of the resources that are medically appropriate to
meet their needs” [5].
When resources are limited, the Society acknowledges
that a situation might arise where “providing a dispro-
portionate share of a health care system's limitedThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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to meet the needs of other patients. Problems of this
sort represent a ‘tragedy of the medical commons’” [5].
While all life is valued, and valued equally, the guidelines
recognize the question of the fairness of expending sub-
stantial resources on one patient and in so doing com-
promising the resources needed by others.
This implicit affirmation of a utilitarian principle
might include the situation, for example, where “a pa-
tient with gastrointestinal hemorrhage continues to
bleed despite all standard interventions and needs large
amounts of blood products. When continued consump-
tion of these blood products would jeopardize availabil-
ity of blood supplies for others, it is justifiable for the
institution to limit further transfusions” [5].
In far more resource constrained patient care settings,
similar questions of allocation of scarce resources arise
daily. Consider the Johannesburg hospital, where the
clinical head of the department of pediatrics and child
health described the impact of crushing resource con-
straints on ICU care allocation: “We don’t ventilate pre-
mature babies less than 1000 g. So a baby weighing
900 g has to take its chances without the support of a
ventilator. About a third of them survive, but we could
easily double that number if we were to ventilate them”
[6]. Such a policy, in my view, could be justified by
appealing to the principle of prioritarianism or utilitar-
ianism. In the former case, priorities are being set based
on clinical need and likelihood of benefit, while in the
latter, the overall limited resources are being allocated to
maximize the benefits across all infants who require
skilled nursing care and ventilation equipment.
In this note I intend to focus narrowly on one particu-
lar application of the egalitarian principle of equality of
opportunity to the allocation of health care resources.
My narrow focus is on patients who have similar med-
ical need for an absolutely scarce, indivisible medical re-
source. The amount of such resources is insufficient in
aggregate to allow all to receive the resources. To break
the ties between apparently equally-deserving claimants,
resources are usually probabilistically allocated either
through lotteries or time-based rationing of first-come-
first-served [4,7,8]. I wish to challenge this, and suggest
that the criterion of prior receipt of medical resources
be used to prioritize against those who have received
such resources before, all else equal.
The central question in this debate is thus whether
equality of opportunity implies that all should receive
equal priority on waiting lists for scarce organs, regard-
less of prior organ receipt. Conversely, the question is
whether egalitarianism implies that all should receive
the opportunity to have one organ. Informally, is it fair
that some will have a second or third ‘helping’ before
others have even had their first? For concreteness, I shallmake use of a continuing example in the setting of organ
transplantation: should we offer repeat kidney trans-
plants to some retransplant candidates when other pri-
mary transplant candidates have not had their first.
I shall lay out the existing consensus arguments for ig-
noring past receipt of medical resources when deciding
about future use of such resources. I intend to take issue
with some of these arguments and will suggest a differ-
ent approach to policy with regards to repeated use of
scarce, indivisible resources. In particular, I intend to
argue against ignoring past receipt of medical resources,
and for prioritizing current allocations in favor of those
who have not consumed such resources before, assum-
ing medical need is otherwise equal. I also attempt to ex-




The bioethical consensus is that prior receipt of such
scarce resources should not be a criterion for decisions
about future distribution of the same resources [3,9,10].
Instead, the Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs views
the likelihood of benefit, the impact of treatment in im-
proving the quality of the patient’s life, the duration of
such benefit, the urgency of a patient’s condition, and
the amount of resources required for successful treat-
ment as all acceptable criteria for resource allocation.
In the continuing example of interest here, this consen-
sus has been implemented. In the United States, the Uni-
ted Network for Organ Sharing, the private organization
that managed organ waiting lists, follows the federal
Department of Health and Human Services’ Final Rule
for the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Net-
work. The network therefore prioritizes kidney allocation
based primarily on length of time on the waiting list,
while other factors include whether the potential organ
candidate is a child, body size of both donor and candi-
date, tissue match between donor and candidate, blood
type, and blood antibody levels [11]. Similarly, in the
Eurotransplant kidney allocation algorithm in Europe,
the most important criteria are HLA matching, urgency,
and waiting time. In particular, if failure of a graft occurs
within three months, waiting time points are eligible for
return, allowing the retransplant candidate to preserve
priority status [12].
Basis for existing guidelines
In the United States, these ethical guidelines rest on sev-
eral arguments. The first is an argument made on the
basis of insufficient and inconclusive guidance from
common theories of justice and rejects consideration of
prior receipt outright. The second, different, argument is
that the principle of equality of opportunity requires
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third argument does not reject such consideration out-
right, but points to logical inconsistencies in how other
receipt of non-medical goods is or is not considered.
Assuming similar health status, it has been argued that
common theories of justice do not persuasively or con-
sistently argue for or against considering prior receipt of
resources [9]. In the absence of explicit guidance from
society’s theories of justice, ignoring prior use of such
resources would thus be a reasonable solution. In a sem-
inal article in the context of organ transplantation, the
main arguments Ubel and colleagues advance against
considering prior resource use is that the conclusions of
common theories of justice are neither persuasive
(which is a weak, qualitative argument), nor consistent
(which seems a far stronger and serious objection) when
considering whom to favor [9]. Ubel and colleagues first
ask whether favoring retransplant candidates over pri-
mary candidates could be justified, and find that fairness
and morality do not favor this. They then ask whether
the primary candidates should be favored over the
retransplant, considering utlity, need, merit, age, social
worth, ability to pay, personal responsibility and quality
of life, and conclude that “these theories are therefore
not much help in deciding how to treat retransplant
candidates” [9].
This conclusion is supported by the position statement
by the Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs which also
adduces another far more explicit argument for ignoring
past use of medical resources. The Council argues: “the
essential problem with a past use of resources criterion
is that it rests on a fundamentally flawed conception of
equality among potential recipients of treatment. Equal-
ity does not impose an ethical requirement that all
patients receive the same amount of care; the only re-
quirement is that patients be judged equally according
to their current needs, based on their diagnoses and
prognoses. Because past use is irrelevant to present
need, it should not factor into allocation decisions” [3].
In my view, this argument already seems inconsistent
with one of the Council’s ‘acceptable criteria for allocat-
ing medical resources’ which is the amount of resources
required for successful treatment. The Council argues in
the same position statement that “. . . occasionally, it
may be appropriate to treat patients who will need less
of a scarce resource rather than patients expected to
need more. This would maximize the number of patients
who could benefit from a scarce resource because each
patient treated would require relatively little of it, thus
making it more readily available for others” [3].
In my view, this utilitarian perspective appeals to the
notion of maximizing the number of patients who could
benefit from a scarce, divisible resource. But it seems
easy to extend this notion of justice to one that wouldsupport my view of prioritizing access to scarce indivis-
ible organs to those who had not yet received one. To
do this conceptually, simply replace one divisible re-
source with a pool of indivisible resources, and contrast
one patient receiving two units of those resources or
two patients receiving one each.
A conceptually very different argument is why should
society base allocation decisions on the narrow basis of
whether such medical resources have been received be-
fore, without considering the patient’s prior receipt of or
access to other medical or even social goods such as in-
come, education or access to primary care? [9,10] These
goods are clearly important as social determinants of
health as “. . .neither the medical nor public health
model is sufficient to improve the health of a population.
Rather, improving health may require a wide range of
strategies, including redistribution of wealth; guarantee-
ing all adults access to a meaningful job that pays an in-
come sufficient to allow them to pursue healthy
behaviors; helping children feel safe and be healthy and
ready to learn; and empowering women and communi-
ties so that they can work more effectively to increase
the health of the population” [13].
While access to such social goods can determine
current health status, a more general argument can be
made that fairness should involve consideration of prior
access to such goods even without documenting a link
to health. As Ubel and colleagues point out: “. . . the pri-
mary transplant candidate may have grown up with all
of life’s advantages while the retransplant candidate has
had to struggle to overcome poverty, absent parents, and
inadequate access to healthcare” [9]. Their argument im-
plies that principles of fairness would try to balance the
receipt of all goods, medical or not, and impacting
health status or not. This is clearly difficult to
conceptualize let alone implement, and Ubel and collea-
gues stress the obvious conceptual and technical difficul-
ties of trying to establish some sort of an allocation
system that would consider prior consumption of mul-
tiple different medical and non-medical goods.
Accordingly the argument is then made that one
should ignore prior receipt of all goods including prior
receipt of past medical resource. This line of argument
has been echoed recently by others who argue against
the notion of a ‘fair share of resources’ in the context of
age-based rationing. Rivlin argues that “we need to know
the amount or size of what is being shared, the numbers
of those among whom it is being shared among, and
whether the claimants have any entitlement to it,” al-
though he expresses his doubts as to our ability to satisfy
those needs [10].
In my view, however, if we are unwilling or unable to
even consider the first and simplest step in considering
access to determinants of health (i.e. prior use of the
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plicitly and unpalatably giving up on more distant, less
related and more complex determinants of health
(e.g. social situation, income and asset levels, ability to
interface with the health system, etc.).
The combination of these diverse arguments leads to
the consensus that neither allocations which discrimin-
ate against prior recipients, nor ‘rule of rescue’ alloca-
tions which favor past recipients can be ethically
supported. By the latter is meant a type of behavior and
a rationale on the part of providers and their institutions
which may feel a moral imperative to not abandon their
patient, especially if it is a patient on whom they have
operated or otherwise treated already, and even more es-
pecially if it is a patient they have done wrong by [14].
For example, in 2003 the Duke University Health System
transplanted mismatched heart and lungs into a critically
ill young female immigrant. Two weeks later, she was
operated on again, given new correctly matched organs
after the rejected organs were removed, ultimately and
unfortunately to no avail [15].
In the prevailing views, all else such as medical need
equal, only simple randomization without consideration
of past access affords equality of opportunity. Ubel and
colleagues find that only graft efficacy differences should
allow us to favor primary versus retransplant candidates
in the narrow context of organ transplantation [9]. The
Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs takes a far more
general view, arguing against prior receipt of medical
resources being considered for any intervention or care,
and explicitly recommending first-come-first served as a
randomization technique for allocation, all else being
equal [3].Why prior resource receipt does matter
Yet this conclusion can be challenged on several fronts.
While waiting time on a transplant list is seen as a seem-
ingly fair and ethical allocation procedure and is in com-
mon use throughout the world, it is also true that
different theories of distributive justice support different
allocation criteria. For example, it has been pointed out
in the setting of kidney allocation that there is no clear
way within a system of normative ethics to decide on
the balance between two criteria such as antigen match-
ing and waiting time [16]. In my view, a criterion such
as retransplant status may also be open to discussion
and potential use to break ties when medical need is
similar instead of using waiting time. In what follows I
summarize three distinct strands of an argument against
the conclusion of ignoring past receipt of medical
resources. These span the views of other stakeholders,
the informational value of prior receipt status, and the
questionable comfort afforded by randomization.The views of other stakeholders
First, while some bioethicists believe that common the-
ories of justice cannot justify considering prior receipt of
resources, the views of those receiving, delivering, pro-
viding and funding such resources matter as well. Baily
has argued more generally that bioethicists “need to
understand the economic, political, medical and empirical
dimensions of the health care rationing problem, to in-
corporate the insights of these fields into their theory. . .”
[17]. Echoing this viewpoint, Ubel argues that the public
deserves a role in decision-making or policy influence in
setting treatment priorities. This is justified by the com-
plexity of the solutions and the possibility that even expert
philosophers can disagree [18].
In my view, there is substantial evidence that seeking
such empirical data reveals important viewpoints. For
example, in the United Kingdom, surveys among the
general public on healthcare priority setting showed that
respondents thought equality of access should prevail
over maximization of benefits. For sufficiently effective
treatments, it was preferred that hypothetical patients
have a more equal chance of receiving treatment with
less regard to their potential benefit from treatment [19].
In the context of the continuing example in this note,
for example, patients with end-stage renal disease may
or may not agree with existing guidelines. Surveys of the
beliefs and opinions about kidney allocation procedures
conducted among US end-stage renal disease patients
find surprising misconceptions about the criteria deter-
mining priorities. Many thought that financial and qual-
ity of life status influenced position on the waiting list,
while many African-Americans thought the system was
biased against their race. Despite these considerations,
few thought the system required revision, and the major-
ity felt the current focus on antigen matching criteria
was fair [20].
On the other hand, highlighting the importance of
ascertaining opinions, other patients may disagree with
allocation priorities. Interviewing a large number of
hemodialysis and renal transplantee patients, a majority
agreed with the current allocation priority for those who
have waited longer. However significant proportions of
patients were opposed to various aspects of the kidney
allocation criteria, chiefly involving complex tradeoffs of
antigen matching against time waited, whether dialysis
had yet begun against time waited, and the use of age as
a criterion. These findings led to a recommendation that
patient opinions should be taken into account in design-
ing allocation rules [21].
Surveys of medical students show similar differences
in opinion about the fairness of repeated kidney trans-
plantation. In Italy, students discussed a complex
pediatric retransplant case and their preferences for
allowing retransplantation were elicited under several
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76% of students approved retransplantation, but when
there were a total of 10 hypothetical patients vying for
the scarce organ, only 32% approved retransplantion.
When asked to imagine that they were the head of a
Transplant department, 22% of students indicated they
would change their opinions, further reducing support
for allowing retransplantation [22].
Supply systems for absolutely scarce resources such as
donor organs depend on the public’s trust that equitable
measures will be used in the distribution. The World
Health Organization Guiding Principle 9 states that
“. . . in the light of the principles of distributive justice
and equity, donated organs should be made available to
patients on the basis of medical need and not on the
basis of financial or other considerations” [23]. However
it has been pointed out this does not address tie-
breaking rules when medical need is similar but
resources do not suffice for all. To cover such eventual-
ities, it has been recommended that advocates who rep-
resent the community and the values of the society
which ultimately furnishes the organs themselves should
be involved in policy-making here [24].
The public’s trust in the principles used to guide such
allocation and consent to the allocation rules seems es-
pecially important given that tax transfer payments
ultimately fund much of the nation’s healthcare expendi-
tures. It has been estimated that about 44% of all
organ transplants in the United States are paid for by
Medicare, with a further 9% paid for by Medicaid, mak-
ing public monies the majority payor. In the US, end-
stage renal disease implies eligibility for Medicare re-
gardless of age, and Medicare will pay for the kidney
transplants through its Part A and Part B programs. Still
in the US, Medicare will also pay for pancreas, lung,
liver, and in some circumstances, heart transplants.
Medicaid rules vary by state but generally will cover
kidney and liver transplants. Private insurance rules are
complex but generally are at least as generous as the
entitlement programs.
This role of tax transfer funding seems to make the
inputs of the tax paying general public important too
simply from a fairness perspective. For example, when
choosing between different allocations of health gains,
surveyed respondents not only consider efficiency, the
total amount of health gains, but also equity, the distri-
bution of the health gains [25]. Surveys have shown that
primary recipients are favored for organ donations com-
pared to those waiting to be retransplanted. Surveys of
liver allocation rule preferences also reveal that the
young are favored over the old; non-drinkers over drin-
kers, those more likely to survive, those who had waited
longest on the list, and primary candidates over re-
transplant candidates [26]. The most commonly statedrationale for these choices was given as prioritarian to-
wards those most likely to survive and benefit from a
liver transplant.
Other studies of preferences over liver allocation rules
measured the relative importance people placed on
prognosis and retransplantation status in allocating
scarce transplantable livers. Respondents in the United
States preferred to allocate scarce donor livers to those
with better prognoses. This preference was slightly
stronger among respondents in which prognosis was
based on retransplant status than when it was claimed
to be associated with a blood marker [27]. In this study,
however, less than 1 in 5 respondents appeared willing
to completely abandon the retransplant candidates by
not allocating any organs to them.
Similar results were documented in the United
Kingdom when university employees were queried
about the relevance of the following criteria (% agreeing
or strongly agreeing that criteria was important in the
selection of liver transplants): age (66%), naturally oc-
curring versus alcoholism-caused liver disease (72%),
ability to survive and benefit (91%), waiting time on the
list (63%), and primary versus re-transplant status
(56%). Again, an overwhelming majority of survey
respondents chose not to abandon the retransplant
candidates [28].
In a broad-ranging literature review of this litera-
ture, community preferences for organ allocation
schemes were reviewed from 15 studies [29]. These
preferences were in conflict without broad consensus
on how to balance criteria such as maximum benefit,
social valuation, moral deservingness, prejudice, fair
innings, first come, first served, and medical urgency.
At least some community preferences were for a fair
innings approach in which respondents felt that
organs should be allocated based on the feeling that
everyone is entitled to an equal chance at some “nor-
mal” span of health and thus give priority to younger
patients. Relevant to this viewpoint, the community
felt that all patients deserved at least one chance of
transplant.
More generally, a preference towards trading off effi-
ciency for more fairness in health care for has been
noted in more abstract health care problems. Students
were required to express preferences for one of two
hypothetical societies, characterized by different distri-
butions of life expectancy among hypothetical unfortu-
nates (with shorter life expectancy) and hypothetical
fortunate (with longer life expectancy). In framings in
which the distributions were known as well as other
framings in which there was uncertainty about the distri-
bution, respondents preferred societies in which the life
expectancy of the unfortunate short-lived individuals
was improved at the cost of the fortunate longer-lived
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relative price of doing so in terms of how much life ex-
pectancy had to be sacrificed by the fortunate [30].
In related sophisticated experiments, samples of stu-
dents and members of the general public were used to
elicit generalized preferences for the trade-off between
equity and efficiency in hypothetical health allocation
situations involving cohorts of newborns. They found a
strong aversion to inequalities in health [31]. Other work
examining the trade-offs between efficiency and fairness
has found a strong preference against allowing prior
winners of probabilistic allocations of financial resources
to participate in future draws [32].
In my view, despite the documented inconsistencies,
this stream of literature lends some support to the role
of stakeholders and their preferences in helping to shape
allocation rules for scarce medical resources. The litera-
ture surveyed here reveals that conflicting opinions have
been elicited regarding ethical principles that should be
used, but there is scattered evidence that primary trans-
plant candidates are somewhat preferred over retrans-
plant candidates. I acknowledge that it is far from
settled that such opinions should be elicited, listened to,
let alone implemented. It has been argued that these
small – possibly unrepresentative – public opinions
about social value preferences may be worse than
appealing to existing democratic processes that drive
policy more formally [33].Informational value of prior receipt status
Second, while a narrow focus on a patient’s prior receipt
of, say, an organ does ignore possible inequity in prior
access to other non-medical resources, this does not
justify ignoring that an organ was in fact received. In a
strawman argument, society could equally well consider
ever increasing sets of prior allocated medical or social
goods [9]. It is implicitly accepted that ranking claimants
on some measure(s) of past receipt of goods is possible,
but difficult to implement. Depending on which goods
were considered in such sets of goods, there might
be different views of the fairness of medical allocation
decisions. In the face of this difficulty, a seemingly
neutral compromise is offered: ignore any and all
information [9].
Yet such information on prior receipt can be simply
and objectively assessed and is directly relevant to
understanding the fairness of repeated receipt. Ignoring
this information risks rejecting the essential along with
the less essential, since such information is unlikely to
have no value. Consider a thought experiment where a
retransplant and a primary candidate of similar health
status, age, and life experience are aware that both are
vying for the same organ. If up to them, how plausible isit that a retransplant candidate would never consider let-
ting a primary candidate have the next chance?
While this thought transplant is infeasible, a close
practical analogy offers intriguing parallels and may in-
form the informational value of prior receipt status.
Consider a healthy donor who forfeits his or her own
existing organ so that another could benefit instead. For
concreteness, assume a mother wishes to donate one of
her own kidneys to a sick daughter. Of course, the ex-
ample is not perfectly analogous, because in practice, if a
candidate patient actually forfeited an organ, this would
be seen as failure to cooperate with care, and could trig-
ger refusal by the transplant network to offer future
transplants [34].
Directed donations are ones in which a healthy donor
states a preference for who is to receive the organ. Since
there is a small risk of mortality, and significant morbid-
ity from the living transplant procedure, there is ration-
ally a cost from such altruism. Most common among
healthy living donors directing a donation to a relative,
they include donors who are not related to the ultimate
beneficiary, and ones in which a donor donates to ‘the
pool’ of organs [35]. Empirically, in the context of direc-
ted kidney donation, 80% of respondents expressed ap-
proval of the practice [36].
Some of these donations have been made for reasons
that imply that some recipients are more special and
more deserving than others, for example coming from
the same town [37]. More morally repugnant versions
would include expressed racial preferences. At least
one example of a prima facie morally troublesome
directed cadaveric donation has taken place in the
organs of a white supremacist were used only for
white recipients as per the deceased’s wishes [38]. Fol-
lowing this one-time example, the state of Florida
passed a law banning these types of directed donation
preferences [39].
Some views on directed donation diverge or are more
nuanced. The UK’s Human Tissue Authority rejected
the cadaveric donation of a daughter’s kidneys to her
mother, since “the central principle of matching and al-
locating organs from the deceased is that they are allo-
cated to the person on the UK Transplant waiting list
who is most in need and who is the best match with the
donor. In line with this central principle, a person can-
not choose to whom their organ can be given when they
die; nor can their family” [40]. This is troubling since the
UK allows living directed donation. It seems that direc-
ted cadaveric donation is consistent with the former,
while both are possibly inconsistent with the principle of
greatest need [41]. A related opposing view holds that
patients’ autonomy to direct donations posthumously is
not in agreement with a purely egalitarian principle of
justice [42]. However in an earlier different context the
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the right to direct their gametes to categories of recipi-
ents accepted as relevant by the moral or religious com-
munities in their society [43].
However in general, directed donations appear to be
compatible with existing bioethical principles of nonma-
leficence, beneficence, utility, autonomy, and distributing
benefits and burdens equitably [44]. It has also been
pointed out that consistency implies that when “we per-
mit living donation, we are in fact indirectly endorsing a
form of directed donation” [45].
In my view, the apparent justice of allowing living
organ donations directed to particular beneficiaries as
opposed to arbitrary beneficiaries supports the import-
ance of considering prior receipt of organs. Suppose we
believe a mother is morally justified in sacrificing a kid-
ney to a daughter who has effectively none. Then we
may well also believe in the justness of allowing or guid-
ing a patient who has already received a kidney to sacri-
fice his or her right to have another organ. Similarly, we
may well also value allowing a donor to state a prefer-
ence that his own kidneys be posthumously available to
those who had not yet had a kidney transplant. To but-
tress the relevance of this analogy, almost half of kidney
transplants today are via living donors [39].
Even if we are not willing to go this far, consider how
ignoring the receipt of prior resources reduces the
chance for altruism. Consider that while uninsured
patients are unlikely to receive a needed organ trans-
plant (comprising just 0.8% of all transplants), they are
the source of as much as 17% of all organs [46]. Given
the disproportionate incidence of important precursor
illnesses, this suggests a profound sense of generosity,
sacrifice and altruism already exists in this sector of
healthcare. This altruism might be extensible to those
who have had a turn on the waiting list and seen their
graft fail. Considering their past receipt of resources and
inquiring of their willingness to be altruistic and offer
another a turn seems worthwhile. Completely ignoring
the informational value of prior receipt of medical
resources seems to go too far.
The comfort of randomization?
The third difficulty with the current consensus is
that in the face of such difficult, subjective decisions,
randomization through lotteries or positions on waiting
lists is held up as a neutral and safe solution. Yet
randomization is a troublesome method of choosing
which of two otherwise equal claimants is more deserv-
ing. While lotteries are generally held to be the least un-
fair mechanisms to allocate resources [47], this only
holds true when all participants are equally deserving.
Without clear agreement that this is actually true, use of
a randomizer merely masks difficult choices that werenot made. In particular, while under conditions of equal
merit a randomizer seems warranted, the converse is not
true. That is, the mere use of a randomizer does not by
itself render all claimants equally deserving. Rather, it
only renders all claimants equally likely to receive the re-
source in question.
These concerns are not theoretical: detailed empirical
research shows that even when the use of a randomizer
is deemed fair, it is not always thought to be appropriate
[48]. A great reluctance has been found among experi-
mental subjects to using randomization to choose be-
tween important and seemingly equivalent alternatives.
The more serious the decision’s implications, the stron-
ger the aversion. In a particularly relevant experiment
on kidney transplantation, arguments to allot the kidney
to one or the other of two patients were held to be
equally strong and equally compelling by a slight major-
ity (53%) of one group of respondents, yet a significantly
smaller minority (26%) of a matched group of respon-
dents chose to use a coin toss to decide between the two
patients [48].
I also note that that the previously cited current ethical
guidelines appeal to first-come-first-served as the effective
randomization device. This probabilistic procedure is
not theoretically different in its outcomes from a lottery
or coin toss, but it has also been criticized for implicitly
favoring the well-off, the better-informed, and those
who have the resources to travel and queue quickly
(e.g. without worrying about childcare or employment).
For example, Apple founder Steve Jobs purchased a resi-
dence in the US state of Tennessee, and obtained his liver
there. Tennessee is known to be a state with one of the
quickest liver waiting lists in the nation.
In my view, the implicit comfort that policy-makers
have with randomization as theoretically fair must be
contrasted with the experimental evidence against such
comfort. A decision-making process based on lot may
thus not be accountable or reasonable, attributes which
are held to be important in society’s decision-making on
healthcare rationing and prioritization [49].
A different model of prioritization
Given the concerns raised above, it is plausible that a
more fair system of allocation of scarce medical
resources would not ignore past receipt of such
resources, and might prioritize against those with past
receipt. Consider the continuing example of allocation
of cadaveric kidney grafts. Historically, significant graft
efficacy differences between primary and retransplant
candidates were deemed the only valid reason for prefer-
ring primary to retransplant candidates [9]. However such
efficacy differences have shrunk dramatically [50,51], due
to better pretransplant screening and improvements in
immunosuppressive medication. In consequence, a large
Table 1 Scarcity and/or divisibility of healthcare
resources




Absolute E.g. organ transplants E.g. blood products
Relative E.g. ICU beds E.g. chemotherapy
Huesch BMC Medical Ethics 2012, 13:11 Page 8 of 12
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/13/11and increasing proportion of patients awaiting a cadaveric
kidney has had a prior kidney transplant [50]. Given that
the kidney transplantation waiting list continues to grow
[52], it is clear that allowing a previously transplanted can-
didate to receive a graft has real opportunity costs for a
primary candidate.
Accordingly, I propose that when patients needing a
transplant have similar medical needs, that retransplant
status be used to prioritize patients for a renal graft. In-
stead of waiting time being used as the dominant criteria
for prioritizing cadaveric kidneys, regardless of retransplant
status, I propose a lexicographic allocation rule which con-
siders medical need first, then retransplant status, and only
then waiting time. The allocation rule I am suggesting is
thus a combination of the prioritarian principle that under-
pins medical need as a criterion, and an adaptation of the
egalitarian system which currently favors waiting time to
provide equal opportunity to all on a list.
Under this rule, patients whose first graft failed would
be obligated to choose between remaining on dialysis
and going onto non-dialysis palliative therapy. In such
an arguably fairer system, every primary transplant can-
didate has an increased chance of receiving a graft, and
except for differences in medical need, no primary trans-
plant patient would see a life-prolonging intervention be
given instead to someone who had had such an inter-
vention already.
Restricting such a basic tier to primary kidney trans-
plantation should not be justified by efficiency – al-
though this is certainly possible – but by perceived
fairness. Indeed, focusing purely on an efficiency argu-
ment and a cost-effectiveness standpoint, repeat kidney
transplantation already compares favorably with other
common therapies [53]. In a strict utilitarian approach,
decision makers should calculate the incremental cost
effectiveness ratio for different potential treatments and
allocate resources in increasing order from the lowest
ratios representing the most affordable improvements in
quality adjusted life years gained to the highest ratios
representing the least affordable. Such an approach
would also favor primary transplants, but I intend to
focus on fairness arguments rather than appeal to utili-
tarian or efficiency arguments in this debate.
Extensions of the framework
This framework could also potentially be extended to
deciding between similar claimants on divisible and/or
relatively scarce medical resources. I turn to this brief
extension here. In Table 1, I sketch out a 2x2 matrix of
scarcity and divisibility, highlighting the bulk of this
paper’s focus on absolutely scarce, indivisible resources.
By relatively scarce is meant resources and interventions
whose supply is limited only by decisions on how many
inputs to apply. More financial resources will allow agreater ICU infrastructure and more procured che-
motherapeutic medication. By divisibility is meant the
ability to take one common unit of the medical resource
and use it for a greater number of patients than one. Of
course these binary distinctions blur the practical
boundaries: a liver is absolutely scarce, but could be
divided to allow more than one patient to benefit. Blood
products cannot easily be increased in supply, since
donations are the critical input. However, increased
costly marketing and a drive for autologous blood for
example, could allow the supply to become less abso-
lutely scarce.
I acknowledge that the current bioethical consensus is
against considering prior receipt of any of the resources in
Table 1, when decisions are to be made regarding current
allocation. In the lower left cell, in the intensive care unit,
the current ethical principles are that all lives are equally
valuable, and it remains unethical to consider prior receipt
of such medical resources [54]. However, prior receipt of
resources, all else equal, could be used to prioritize re-
source allocation towards those who had consumed less
intensive care in the past. It is theoretically possible to go
from prioritizing kidney grafts to prioritizing intensive
treatment of community acquired pneumonia in a geriat-
ric population in an intensive care setting.
Analogous extensions to the right hand columns of
Table 1 could be used to re-prioritize treatment for re-
current cancer below those for initial treatments. A par-
tial implementation could simply be tiered co-payments
that progressively increase a patient’s share of the cost of
repeated treatment while holding patient responsibility
for primary treatments at zero. Such an implementation
would be analogous to the designs of value-based insur-
ance that use tiered benefit structures to incent patient
choices of more evidence-based and/or cheaper alterna-
tive pharmaceuticals. An unfortunate feature of such
schemes is their regressive structure in favoring richer
subscribers or patients for whom the relative cost is far
smaller than for the poorer [55]. While not strictly deny-
ing repeated access to patients, such schemes could be
seen as having unpalatable consequences on the distri-
bution of healthcare.
Relationship with a ‘decent minimum’
Prioritizing opportunities to receive a kidney transplant
could also be seen to be part of a basic tier guaranteed
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echo recent discussion on the ethical acceptability of
tiered healthcare [56]. A related, earlier argument pre-
mised on the core value of equality of opportunity is that
social resources such as healthcare are to be allocated so
as to ensure that everyone has a ‘decent minimum’ and
can attain the normal opportunity range for his or her
society [57]. In Buchanan’s early view, the popularity of
this notion hinges on a number of attractive features.
First, “the idea of a decent minimum is to be understood
in a society-relative sense. Surely it is plausible to as-
sume that, as with other rights to goods or services, the
content of the right must depend upon the resources
available in a given society and perhaps also upon a cer-
tain consensus of expectations among its members” [57].
Clearly a societal debate is needed on the content of
such a decent minimum [58], but in the context of organ
transplantation, a decent minimum might well include
only one kidney transplant because of the limited extent
of available kidneys and perhaps because the expecta-
tions of society are such that one turn on a list for all is
better than two turns for some.
Second, “the idea of a decent minimum is that since
the right to health care must be limited in scope (to
avoid the consequences of a strong equal access right), it
should be limited to the 'most basic' services, those nor-
mally 'adequate' for health, or for a 'decent' or 'tolerable'
life” [57]. Again, seen in the context of society’s expecta-
tions, the most basic service for those with end-stage renal
disease would include free dialysis and could potentially
include at most one attempt at kidney transplantation.
It is important to note that such a right to a decent
minimum is difficult to support from a theoretical view
or from the perspective of universal rights. It is argued
that arguments from special-rights, such as the obliga-
tion to provide some standard of equal protection from
particular harms, can contribute to supporting this no-
tion of a decent minimum [57].
More recently, explicit rationing schemes have been
proposed that implicitly reflect the fat-tailed distribution
in consumption of healthcare and the finite resources of
payors and funders. For example, in the United States
currently, the top 1% of healthcare consumers consume
20.2% of all system healthcare expenditures and the top
15% consume 73.4% of all expenditures [59]. Given the
resource constraints of payors and funders and the diffi-
culties in access among under-insured and uninsured
Americans, a reasonable approach to resource distribu-
tion is to postulate a right to a decent minimum of
healthcare. Krohmal and Emanuel have noted that “. . .
the principles of justice require society to provide its
members with vital goods and services essential to
human flourishing. Nonetheless, Rawls reminds us that
the need for distributive justice arises precisely whenscarcity precludes giving everyone all that they want or
need. In allocating limited funds between competing
public pursuits, justice’s demand that some critical ser-
vices be provided is no less a requirement that other ser-
vices of lesser importance or inordinate expense be
forgone” [56].
Relationship with a ‘fair innings’
In a type of age-based rationing, Williams popularized
the concept of a ‘fair innings’ which can be related to
the proposed prioritization scheme described in this
note. His notion of a fair innings is predicated on the
view that “while it is always a misfortune to die when
one wants to go on living, it is not a tragedy to die in
old age; but it is on the other hand both a tragedy and a
misfortune to be cut off prematurely” [60].
Williams used this phrase as a cricketing metaphor for
a fair length and quality of life – analogous to the num-
ber of runs scored in a single cricket innings. In an early
contribution he pointed out that “. . . giving priority to
one group of people means taking it away from another
group. . . we must not shrink from identifying who (im-
plicitly) the ‘low priority’ people are, in any particular
system of health care” [61]. In his own view, the lower
priority people should be those who like him who “should
not expect to have as much spent on a health improve-
ment for them as would be spent to generate the same
benefit for someone who is unlikely ever to attain what we
have already enjoyed. It calls for self-restraint by us elderly
and especially by those of us who have flourished in health
terms throughout our lives” [61].
The notion of a fair innings as a principle guiding
healthcare resource allocation has been challenged. The
prioritization of the young over the old in some settings
would not be in line with Scandinavian government guide-
lines, for example [62]. Empirically, some support for the
implied age-based rationing that underpins the fair in-
nings argument has been found: respondents are willing
to sacrifice overall health gains to favor the younger whose
future or lifetime prospects are poor [63].
By contrast, the proposed approach in this note extends
the idea of a ‘fair innings’ as a fair chance of treatment
and, more specifically, a fair number of chances of treat-
ment if the patient’s first treatment fails – analogous to
the number of innings allowed. This notion of a ‘fair
chance at bat’ is independent of, but related to a fair in-
nings. Two patients in need of a particular scarce medical
resource may have the same quality adjusted life expect-
ancy, so the fair innings argument could be agnostic to
who should be privileged in further allocation of medical
resources. However, similar to the fair innings argument, a
fair chance at bat argument reflects the same aversion to
inequality, seeks to consider prior patient experiences, and
is eminently and immediately quantifiable [64].
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More generally, allocation frameworks such as the one
proposed here which favor those who had not previously
accessed a particular resource could better align the
incentives of patients with those of society. Knowing that
an intervention was a ‘one off ’ or would be personally
more expensive next time could better incent recipients to
adhere to medication and post-treatment plans. One
might imagine in my continued example that a repeated
transplant process is already a negative incentive, given
the hospitalization, the disruption of usual life, the risks
and the financial costs. However there is no evidence that
the demand for repeated transplants declines. Indeed,
waiting lists (including for retransplants) grow steadily
and already far outpace the available supply of organs.
Knowing that a second treatment would cost the
patient more or would not be allowed could similarly
encourage a focus by patient and physician on evidence-
based treatment the first time around. The possibility of
such additional efficiency improvements over time
would be further advantages of rethinking the current
consensus against considering prior medical resource
use. Without addressing the implementation challenges,
such an approach would require that the ‘standard of
care’ be changed by entitlement payors, private payors
and specialist medical societies. In the United Kingdom,
existing oorganizations such as the National Institute for
Health and Clinical Excellence are successful exemplars of
the implementation of such public processes that seek to
“decide what new technologies, devices, or drugs should
be part of the benefit package of the National Health Ser-
vice” [65]. In the US, these efforts are far more diffuse, less
well coordinated and underdeveloped. The implementa-
tion of the particular recommendation that I view posi-
tively in this paper, is unfortunately part of a much larger
and more difficult discussion on how to ensure conform-
ance with existing evidence-based guidelines [66].
Finally, I acknowledge that even successfully resolving
this particular equality of access question does not ne-
cessarily address the potential for differences in quality
and in health agency to still systematically impact differ-
ent patients’ ability to achieve healthy functioning [67].
In the present context, it is possible that patients with
prior use of medical resources have a systematically
enhanced ability to interface with the care delivery sys-
tem (i.e. they know how to ‘work the system’). All else
equal, this could be yet another argument for weighting
the scales against those patients in favor of more medic-
ally ‘naïve’ patients.
Conclusion
Current bioethical guidelines hold that when allocating
scarce, indivisible resources such as organs, no consider-
ation should be given to retransplant status beyond itsimpact on medical need. Conditional on equal medical
need, waiting time is the most important criteria for
prioritization of kidney grafts. This allocation rule is
thought to be equitable in that it affords equality of op-
portunity to all waiting. Based on a number of concerns,
including empirically elicited social value preferences, I
have suggested instead that conditional on equal medical
need, primary transplant candidates should be given pri-
ority over retransplant candidates. A broader debate on
existing allocation rules seems worthwhile given a uni-
versal the interplay between limited resources and grow-
ing need for scarce healthcare resources.
Summary
The gap between what is possible and demanded in
health care delivery, and what can actually be afforded is
clear, already unbridgeable and still growing. While
existing guidelines recommend against considering a
patient’s past use of medical resources, when making
decisions about the allocation of future resources, I have
discussed several issues with this consensus. Most fun-
damentally, research on the preferences of patients and
the general public suggests that such prior use should be
considered when making decisions about future use.
The allocation framework sketched here prioritizes
against those who are prior consumers of the scarce
medical resource. It can be seen as improving the likeli-
hood of all claimants receiving some absolutely scarce
and indivisible resource, and reducing the chance that
some receive more than one while others still wait. In
my view, this could be part of a societally guaranteed
‘basic tier’ of benefits. More work is necessary to under-
stand societal preferences, and the views of those who
are not spectators but stakeholders in such allocation
processes. However, it seems to me that from those to
whom much has already been given medically, it may be
time to ask something in return. For those who are
missing out, getting a chance at a fairer turn seems
worth more consideration.
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